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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 14-1119 
__________ 
 
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. 
 
 v. 
 
 GATEWAY FUNDING DIVERSIFIED MORTGAGE 
SERVICES, L.P., 
 
                                                          Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-06089) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
__________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2015 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, Jr. and KRAUSE, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 7, 2015) 
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Paul A. Bucco, Esq. 
Matthew I. Sack, Esq. 
Davis, Bucco & Ardizzi 
10 East 6th Avenue, Suite 100 
Conshohocken, PA 19428 
Attorneys for Defendant–Appellant 
 
Matthew D. Spohn, Esq. 
Norton Rose Fulbright 
1200 17th Street, Suite 1000 
Denver, CO 80202 
 
Jonathan S. Franklin, Esq. 
Norton Rose Fulbright 
801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 
Washington, DC 20004 
Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellee 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal presents us with an opportunity to emphasize 
the importance of following the rules. At issue is Rule 10 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which imposes certain 
duties on counsel in preparing the record on appeal. Appellant 
Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services, L.P. violated 
Rule 10 when it failed to include in the appellate record a 
transcript necessary to evaluate its principal claim. We hold that 
claim forfeited. And because we find Gateway’s other claims to 
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lack merit, we will affirm the judgment of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in favor 
of Appellee Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.  
 
I 
 
 In 2011 Lehman brought suit in the District Court, 
claiming Gateway was obliged to make good on four mortgage 
loans that Lehman’s subsidiary1 purchased almost ten years 
earlier from Arlington Capital Mortgage Corporation. One of 
the four loans is not at issue on appeal, and the other three were 
the subject of two contracts dated May 17, 2007 in which 
Arlington agreed to indemnify Lehman for losses on those loans. 
The following year, Arlington sold its assets to Gateway. 
Because Arlington had no assets to satisfy Lehman’s claims for 
indemnification when losses on the loans occurred, Lehman 
sought recovery from Gateway as Arlington’s alleged successor 
under Pennsylvania’s de facto merger doctrine. 
 
 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the 
District Court denied Gateway’s motion while partially granting 
Lehman’s. The District Court held that although it was clear 
Arlington was liable to Lehman on the three loans, it was 
unclear whether Gateway was liable for Arlington’s debts and a 
trial was necessary to determine whether a de facto merger had 
taken place between Gateway and Arlington. 
 
                                                 
 1 Because the distinction between subsidiary and parent 
company is immaterial to this appeal, we refer to both as 
Lehman. 
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 The District Court held a bench trial to decide the 
dispositive question. After making detailed findings of fact 
regarding the relationship between Gateway and Arlington and 
after considering the relevant state law, the Court concluded that 
a de facto merger had occurred. Accordingly, it held Gateway 
liable to Lehman for indemnification on the three loans—an 
amount totaling around $450,000 plus interest. 
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, as the parties are citizens of different states and the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. We have jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 Our standard of review is mixed. We review the District 
Court’s summary judgment de novo. Indian Brand Farms, Inc. 
v. Novartis Crop Prot. Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 213 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2010). We review its decision regarding whether a defense has 
been waived for abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 
144, 158 (3d Cir. 2012). The abuse of discretion standard also 
guides our review of the District Court’s decisions to deny 
Gateway’s motions for a continuance and to consolidate this 
case with another. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 
254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We . . . review a district court’s 
decisions regarding discovery and case management for abuse of 
discretion.”); see also United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 176 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“We give a district court broad discretion in its 
rulings concerning case management both before and during 
trial.”). Finally, “[o]n appeal from a bench trial, our court 
reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its 
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conclusions of law de novo.” VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 
III 
 
 Gateway argues that the District Court erred by: (1) 
granting partial summary judgment to Lehman on its 
indemnification agreement with Arlington; (2) refusing to grant 
Gateway a continuance to retain expert witnesses; (3) refusing to 
consolidate the case with another; and (4) finding that a de facto 
merger occurred between Gateway and Lehman. We consider 
each argument in turn. 
 
A 
 
 Gateway first contends that the District Court should not 
have granted summary judgment because a clause in the 
indemnification agreement may have extinguished Arlington’s 
(and therefore Gateway’s) liability. The District Court deemed 
Gateway to have waived this argument, stating: “In its briefing, 
Gateway argued that the indemnification obligation was 
extinguished . . . . However, Gateway abandoned this argument 
during oral argument held telephonically on April 24, 2013, and 
so I will not address it here.” Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., 942 F. Supp. 
2d 516, 529 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Gateway now contends it did 
not abandon that argument in the District Court. 
 
 Instead of ordering a transcript of the April 24 oral 
argument and including it in the record on appeal, Gateway 
merely asserted that “there is no record to support the [District] 
Court’s position that Gateway ‘abandoned’ this argument[.]” 
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Gateway Br. 13. This statement was untrue; in fact, there is a 
record of that hearing and Lehman filed it with its appellate 
brief. Gateway responded that it “did not include the transcript 
of oral argument . . . because it was under the impression that 
the argument was conducted off the record and that no transcript 
existed for the oral argument.” Gateway Reply Br. 1. And 
because Lehman filed it, Gateway argued, “the transcript is now 
a part of the record” and it is irrelevant that Gateway neglected 
to do so. Id. at 2. Gateway’s cavalier argument is wrong. 
 
 Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
governs the record on appeal and requires the appellant to 
“order . . . a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not 
already on file as the appellant considers necessary.” Fed. R. 
App. P. 10(b)(1)(A). Moreover, “[i]f the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the 
evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that 
finding or conclusion.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). Although Rule 
10 does not provide for sanctions for failure to compile the 
record, Rule 3 states that failure to comply with the appellate 
rules allows “the court of appeals to act as it considers 
appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 
3(a)(2). Because of its failure to comply with Rule 10, we hold 
that Gateway forfeited its first argument, viz., that its 
indemnification obligation was extinguished. 
 
 We recognize that “[d]ismissal of an appeal for failure to 
comply with procedural rules is not favored,” and that the 
discretion to dismiss a case afforded by Rule 3 “should be 
sparingly used.” Horner Equip. Int’l, Inc. v. Seascape Pool Ctr., 
Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1989). After considering “such 
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factors as whether the defaulting party’s action is willful or 
merely inadvertent, whether a lesser sanction can bring about 
compliance and the degree of prejudice the opposing party has 
suffered because of the default,” we conclude that Gateway’s 
failure to provide a transcript of the April 24 hearing presents 
the unusual situation where forfeiture is appropriate.2 Id. 
Gateway specifically claimed that “there is no record to support 
the [District] Court’s position that Gateway ‘abandoned’ this 
argument, thus it was extremely prejudiced by such ruling.” 
Gateway Br. 13 (emphasis added). That contention was proven 
wrong. Combining that assertion with Gateway’s weak post hoc 
justification that it “was under the impression that the [April 24] 
argument was conducted off the record,” Gateway Reply Br. 1, 
Gateway’s Rule 10 violation at best shows a remarkable lack of 
diligence and at worst indicates an intent to deceive this Court. 
                                                 
2 It is unlikely that we would disturb the District Court’s 
ruling that Gateway waived its extinguishment argument even if 
we did consider the April 24 transcript. That decision would be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, a difficult standard for 
Gateway to satisfy. Sharp, 669 F.3d at 158. A review of the 
transcript indicates that, rather than hastily find the argument 
abandoned, the Court gave Gateway multiple chances to 
advance it. For example, after asking several questions about 
that argument (in response to which Gateway’s counsel 
generally stated that it did not wish to pursue the argument), 
Judge Brody said, “Okay . . . . [O]ne last chance. There’s 
nothing about [the extinguishment argument] that I should be 
concerned with, is that right?” Supp. App. 14. Gateway’s 
counsel responded, consistent with previous responses, “Not that 
I can see, Your Honor.” Id.   
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In either case, forfeiture is appropriate.  See, e.g., Muniz 
Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Servs., 757 F.2d 1357, 1358 (1st Cir. 
1985); Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234, 
237 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 156 
n.18 (6th Cir. 1978); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 245–46 (7th 
Cir. 1993); Brattrud v. Town of Exline, 628 F.2d 1098, 1099 
(8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 
924 F.2d 167, 169–70 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); King v. 
Unocal Corp., 58 F.3d 586, 587–88 (10th Cir. 1995); Abood v. 
Block, 752 F.2d 548, 550 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).  
 
B 
 
 Gateway’s remaining arguments—that the Court erred by 
(1) denying Gateway a continuance to obtain expert witnesses; 
(2) denying Gateway’s motion to consolidate; and (3) finding 
that a de facto merger had occurred—are unpersuasive. 
Continuances modifying discovery schedules should be granted 
“only for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). We “will not 
interfere with the discretion of the district court by overturning a 
discovery order absent a demonstration that the court’s action 
made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in 
such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was 
impossible.” Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Gateway argues that it showed good cause because its counsel 
“was unfamiliar with the case” after it decided to change 
lawyers before trial. Gateway Br. 19. But counsel’s unfamiliarity 
with the case did not make it impossible to obtain evidence—
more diligent discovery was certainly possible, albeit by 
previous counsel. Cf. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 
633–34 (1962) (parties cannot “avoid the consequences of the 
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acts or omissions of [their] freely selected agent[s]. Any other 
notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of 
representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound 
by the acts of his lawyer-agent[.]”). The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying a continuance on that ground. 
 
 Nor was the District Court’s denial of consolidation an 
abuse of discretion. Gateway sought to consolidate this case—
which was filed in 2011—with a case it filed in 2013 seeking 
contribution and indemnity from Arlington for any liability 
Gateway had to Lehman. “If actions before the court involve a 
common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate 
the actions . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (emphasis added). But in 
light of the vastly different stages of the cases—Gateway filed 
its complaint in the contribution action just eight days before it 
moved to consolidate, while discovery had already closed and 
Lehman had already submitted its trial brief in this case—the 
District Court acted well within its discretion in declining to 
consolidate. 
 
 Finally, the District Court neither made clearly erroneous 
factual findings nor relied on incorrect legal principles when it 
held after trial that a de facto merger occurred between Gateway 
and Arlington. The Court correctly structured its analysis around 
the four factors that apply under Pennsylvania law: 
 
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the 
seller corporation, so that there is continuity of 
management, personnel, physical location, assets, 
and general business operations. 
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(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which 
results from the purchasing corporation paying for 
the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, 
this stock ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so that they 
become a constituent part of the purchasing 
corporation. 
 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary 
business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
soon as legally and practically possible. 
 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those 
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for 
the uninterrupted continuation of normal business 
operations of the seller corporation.  
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified 
Mortg. Servs., L.P., 989 F. Supp. 2d 411, 431 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(quoting Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 
A.3d 951, 956 (Pa. 2012)). These factors “are not a 
mechanically-applied checklist, but a map to guide a reviewing 
court” in deciding whether a de facto merger occurred. Fizzano 
Bros., 42 A.3d at 969. 
 The District Court painstakingly conducted its de facto 
merger analysis, providing detailed factual findings and legal 
conclusions pertinent to each factor. Regarding the first factor, 
continuity of enterprise, it noted that “Arlington’s former offices 
continued to operate as the Arlington Branch of Gateway . . . . 
[T]he same personnel continued to carry out the same business 
operations, in the same markets, using the same assets, and at 
the same physical locations as Arlington had prior to the 
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transaction.” Lehman Bros., 989 F. Supp. 2d at 432. “[T]he 
transition to Gateway occurred with minimal interruption to 
Arlington’s ongoing business.” Id. Regarding the second factor, 
continuity of ownership, the Court found that although the 
Arlington shareholders had not acquired Gateway stock in the 
transition, they “retained an ownership interest in [Arlington] 
after the transaction by virtue of . . . contractual profit sharing 
entitlements.”3 Id. at 436. “Before the transaction, the Arlington 
owners shared in Arlington’s profits as shareholders. After the 
transaction, they continued to share in the profits of the 
Arlington Branch of Gateway.” Id. at 434. Regarding the third 
factor, the cessation of business by the seller company, the Court 
stated that “[a]lthough this factor is the most debatable of the 
factors, I find that it weighs slightly in favor of [de facto 
merger],” because Arlington, as a separate entity, maintained 
only a “minimal level of activity” after the asset purchase.4 Id. at 
                                                 
3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently concluded 
that an exchange of shares is not essential to a de facto merger, 
in part because statutory merger does not require an exchange of 
shares in order to be effected. Fizzano Bros., 42 A.3d at 968. 
Instead, merely “some sort of continuation of the stockholders’ 
ownership” must be found. Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
4 This factor differs from the first factor by focusing on 
whether the seller as an entity continues to exist, while the first 
considers whether the operations, management, and assets—in 
short, the enterprise, albeit not the entity—of the seller continue 
as a part of the buyer company. Here, the first factor weighed in 
favor of de facto merger because the “personnel, management, 
physical location, assets, and general business operations” of 
12 
 
437. And regarding the fourth factor, assumption of ordinary 
business liabilities by the purchaser, the Court noted that 
“Gateway assumed substantially all of Arlington’s debt and 
liabilities related to its ongoing loan origination business.” Id. at 
438. Thus, “[a]ll four factors of the de facto merger analysis 
individually weigh[ed]” in favor of such a finding. Id. at 439. 
 In sum, we find no error in the District Court’s analysis 
of the de facto merger issue. On appeal, Gateway rehashes the 
arguments it made to the District Court, essentially asking us to 
weigh the evidence anew and make factual findings. We will not 
do so because clear error is reserved for findings “completely 
devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility.” VICI Racing, 763 F.3d at 298 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The District Court’s decision was guided by the 
correct legal principles and supported by significant evidence. 
Accordingly, we will affirm its judgment. 
                                                                                                             
Arlington continued to exist—as part of Gateway. Lehman 
Bros., 989 F. Supp. 2d at 432. The third factor, by contrast, 
weighed only slightly in favor of de facto merger because 
Arlington did not formally dissolve as a company, though it did 
“essentially devolve[] into an assetless shell.” Id. at 437. 
